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ABSTRACT
Privacy preservation is an important issue in the release of data
for mining purposes. The k-anonymity model has been introduced
for protecting individual identification. Recent studies show that
a more sophisticated model is necessary to protect the association
of individuals to sensitive information. In this paper, we propose
an (α, k)-anonymity model to protect both identifications and rela-
tionships to sensitive information in data. We discuss the proper-
ties of (α, k)-anonymity model. We prove that the optimal (α, k)-
anonymity problem is NP-hard. We first present an optimal global-
recoding method for the (α, k)-anonymity problem. Next we pro-
pose a local-recoding algorithm which is more scalable and result
in less data distortion. The effectiveness and efficiency are shown
by experiments. We also describe how the model can be extended
to more general cases.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Applications]: Data Mining; K.4.1 [Public Pol-
icy Issues]: Privacy
General Terms
Algorithms, Theory, Performance, Experimentation
Keywords
anonymity, privacy preservation, data publishing, data mining H.2
1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy preservation has become a major issue in many data min-
ing applications.When a data set is released to other parties for data
mining, some privacy-preserving technique is often required to re-
duce the possibility of identifying sensitive information about indi-
viduals. This is called the disclosure-control problem [4] in statis-
tics and has been studied for many years. Most statistical solutions
concern more about maintaining statistical invariant of data. The
data mining community has been studying this problem aiming at
building strong privacy-preserving models and designing efficient
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Job Birth Postcode Illness
Cat1 1975 4350 HIV
Cat1 1955 4350 HIV
Cat1 1955 5432 flu
Cat1 1955 5432 fever
Cat2 1975 4350 flu
Cat2 1975 4350 fever
Table 1: Raw Medical Data
Set
Job Birth Postcode Illness
Cat1 * 4350 HIV
Cat1 * 4350 HIV
Cat1 1955 5432 flu
Cat1 1955 5432 fever
Cat2 1975 4350 flu
Cat2 1975 4350 fever
Table 2: A 2-anonymous
Data Set of Table 1
Job Birth Postcode Illness
* 1975 4350 HIV
* * 4350 HIV
Cat1 1955 5432 flu
Cat1 1955 5432 fever
* * 4350 flu
* 1975 4350 fever
Table 3: An Alternative 2-
anonymous Data Set of Ta-
ble 1
Job Birth Postcode Illness
* * 4350 HIV
* * 4350 HIV
* * 5432 flu
* * 5432 fever
* * 4350 flu
* * 4350 fever
Table 4: A (0.5, 2)-
anonymous Table of Table 1
by Full-Domain Generaliza-
tion
optimal and scalable heuristic solutions. The perturbing method [2]
and the k-anonymity model [11, 10] are two major techniques for
this goal. The k-anonymity model has been extensively studied
recently because of its relative conceptual simplicity and effective-
ness (e.g. [5, 1]).
In this paper, we focus on a study on the k-anonymity prop-
erty [11, 10]. The k-anonymity model assumes a quasi-identifier,
which is a set of attributes that may serve as an identifier in the
data set. It is assumed that the dataset is a table and that each tu-
ple corresponds to an individual. Let Q be the quasi-identifier. An
equivalence class of a table with respect to Q is a collection of all
tuples in the table containing identical values for Q. For example,
tuples 1 and 2 in Table 2 form an equivalence class with respect
to attribute set {Job, Birth, Postcode}. The size of an equivalence
class indicates the strength of identification protection of individu-
als in the equivalent class. If the number of tuples in an equivalence
class is greater, it will be more difficult to re-identify individual. A
data set D is k-anonymous with respect to Q if the size of every
equivalence class with respect to Q is k or more. As a result, it is
less likely that any tuple in the released table can be linked to an
individual and thus personal privacy is preserved.
For example, we have a raw medical data set as in Table 1. At-
tributes job, birth and postcode1 form the quasi-identifier. Two
unique patient records 1 and 2 may be re-identified easily since
1We use a simplified postcode scheme in this paper. There are
four single digits, representing states, regions, cities and suburbs.
Postcode 4350 indicates state-region-city-suburb.
their combinations of job, birth and postcode are unique. The ta-
ble is generalized as a 2-anonymous table as in Table 2. This table
makes the two patients less likely to be re-identified.
In the literature of k-anonymization, there are two main models.
One model is global recoding [11, 7, 5, 10] while the other is local
recoding [11, 1].
We assume that each attribute has a corresponding conceptual
hierarchy or taxonomy. A lower level domain in the hierarchy pro-
vides more details than a higher level domain. For example, birth
date in D/M/Y (e.g. 15/Mar/1970) is a lower level domain and birth
date in Y (e.g. 1970) is a higher level domain. We assume such
hierarchies for numerical attributes too. In particular, we have a hi-
erarchical structure defined with {value, interval, ?}, where value
is the raw numerical data, interval is the range of the raw data and ?
is a symbol representing any values. Generalization replaces lower
level domain values with higher level domain values. For example,
birth D/M/Y is replaced by M/Y.
In global recoding, all values of an attribute come from the same
domain level in the hierarchy. For example, all values in Birth date
are in years, or all are in both months and years. One advantage is
that an anonymous view has uniform domains but it may lose more
information. For example, a global recoding of Table 1 may be
Table 4 and it suffers from over-generalization. With local recod-
ing, values may be generalized to different levels in the domain.
For example, Table 2 is a 2-anonymous table by local recoding. In
fact one can say that local recoding is a more general model and
global recoding is a special case of local recoding. Note that, in the
example, known values are replaced by unknown values (*). This
is called suppression, which is one special case of generalization,
which is in turn one of the ways of recoding.
Let us return to the earlier example. If we inspect Table 2 again,
we can see that though it satisfies 2-anonymity property, it does not
protect two patients’ sensitive information, HIV infection. We may
not be able to distinguish the two individuals for the first two tuples,
but we can derive the fact that both of them are HIV infectious.
Suppose one of them is the mayor, we can then confirm that the
mayor has contracted HIV. Surely, this is an undesirable outcome.
Note that this is a problem because the other individual whose gen-
eralized identifying attributes are the same as the mayor also has
HIV. Table 3 is an appropriate solution. Since (*,1975,4350) is
linked to multiple diseases (i.e. HIV and fever) and (*,*,4350) is
also linked to multiple diseases (i.e. HIV and flu), it protects indi-
vidual identifications and hides the implication.
We see from the above that protection of relationship to sen-
sitive attribute values is as important as identification protection.
Thus there are two goals for privacy preservation: (1) to protect
individual identifications and (2) to protect sensitive relationships.
Our focus in this paper is to build a model to protect both in a dis-
closed data set. We propose an (α, k)-anonymity model, where α
is a fraction and k is an integer. In addition to k-anonymity, we
require that, after anonymization, in any equivalence class, the fre-
quency (in fraction) of a sensitive value is no more than α. We
first extend the well-known k-anonymity algorithm Incognito [7]
to our (α, k)-anonymity problem. As the algorithm is not scalable
to the size of quasi-identifier and may give a lot of distortions to the
data since it is global-recoding based, we also propose an efficient
local-recoding based method.
This proposal is different from the work of association rules hid-
ing [12] in a transactional data set, where the rules to be hidden
have to be known beforehand and each time only one rule can be
hidden. Also, the implementation assumes that frequent itemsets of
rules are disjoint, which is unrealistic. Our scheme blocks all rules
from quasi-identifications to a sensitive class.
This work is also different from the work of template-based pri-
vacy preservation in classification problems [13], which considers
hiding strong associations between some attributes and sensitive
classes and combines k-anonymity with association hiding. There,
the solution considers global recoding by suppression only and the
aim is to minimize a distortion effect that is designed and dedi-
cated for a classification problem. The model defined in this paper
is more general in that we allow local recoding and that we aim
at minimizing the distortions of data modifications without any at-
tachment to a particular data mining method such as classification.
The (c, l)-diversity model [8] is proposed to solve the above
problem, which is called the homogeneity attack. However, the
(c, l)-diversity model also aims at countering another kind of at-
tack, which is assuming that the attacker has background knowl-
edge to rule out some possible values in a sensitive attribute for the
targeted victim. Parameter l describes the level of diversity of sen-
sitive values. If l is larger, there will be more different sensitive val-
ues in a group. The idea of using parameters c and l is to ensure that
the most frequent sensitive value in a group should not be too fre-
quent after the next p most frequent sensitive values are removed,
where p is related to parameter l. It is quite difficult for users to set
parameters c and l. Though we anticipate attacks with background
knowledge, it is not clear what background knowledge an attacker
may have. For example, it is possible that the attacker can rule
out 90% of the possibilities if he/she judges from the symptoms
(e.g. coughing). An attacker knows that his/her neighbor should
have either one of a few diseases (e.g. lung cancer), among tens
or even hundreds of other diseases that have no relationship to the
symptoms. To keep such background knowledge at bay, we must
prepare for the elimination of a large amount of possible values.
Setting c and l to fortify against the exclusion of say over 90% of
all possibilities would require massive generalization, if not simply
impossible. Besides we do not know what other kinds of back-
ground knowledge an attacker may have. Hence we believe that
background knowledge attack should be handled by more special
treatment and not by a general anonymization mechanism. Also,
the proposed algorithm in [8] is based on a global-recoding exhaus-
tive algorithm Incognito, which is not scalable and may generate
more distortion compared to local recoding.
We propose to handle the issues of k-anonymity with protection
of sensitive values for sensitive attributes.
Our Contributions:
• We propose a simple and effective model to protect both
identifications and sensitive associations in a disclosed data
set. The model extends the k-anonymity model to the (α, k)-
anonymity model to limit the confidence of the implications
from the quasi-identifier to a sensitive value (attribute) to
within α in order to protect the sensitive information from
being inferred by strong implications. We prove that the op-
timal (α, k)-anonymity by local recoding is NP-hard.
• We extend Incognito[7], a global-recoding algorithm for the
k-anonmity problem, to solve this problem for (α, k)-anonymity.
We also propose a local-recoding algorithm, which is scal-
able and generate less distortion. In our experiment, we show
that, on average, the local-recoding based algorithm performs
about 4 times faster and gives about 3 times less distortions
of the data set compared with the extended Incognito algo-
rithm. We also describe how the model can be extended to
more general cases.
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The k-anonymity model requires that every value set for the
quasi-identifier attribute set has a frequency of zero or at least k.
For example, Table 1 does not satisfy 2-anonymity property since
tuples {Cat1, 1975, 4350} and {Cat1, 1955, 4350} occur once. Ta-
ble 2 satisfies 2-anonymity property. Consider a large collection of
patient records with different medical conditions. Some diseases
are sensitive, such as HIV, but many diseases are common, such as
cold and fever. Only associations with sensitive diseases need pro-
tection. To start with, we assume only one sensitive value, such as
HIV. We introduce the α-deassociation requirement for the protec-
tion.
DEFINITION 1 (α-DEASSOCIATION REQUIREMENT). Given
a data set D, an attribute set Q and a sensitive value s in the do-
main of attribute S 6∈ Q. Let (E, s) be the set of tuples in equiva-
lence class E containing s for S and α be a user-specified thresh-
old, where 0 < α < 1. Data set D is α-deassociated with respect
to attribute set Q and the sensitive value s if the relative frequency
of s in every equivalence class is less than or equal to α. That is,
|(E, s)|/|E| ≤ α for all equivalence classes E.
For example, Table 3 is 0.5-deassociated with respect to attribute
set {Job, Birth, Postcode} and sensitive value HIV. There are three
equivalence classes: {t1, t6}, {t2, t5} and {t3, t4}. For each of the
first two equivalent classes of size two, only one tuple contains HIV
and therefore |(E, s)|/|E| = 0.5. For the third equivalence class,
no tuple contains HIV and therefore |(E, s)|/|E| = 0. Thus, for
any equivalence classes, |(E, s)|/|E| ≤ 0.5.
Our objective is therefore to anonymize a data set so that it sat-
isfies both the k-anonymity and the α-deassociation criteria.
DEFINITION 2 ((α, k)-ANONYMIZATION). A view of a table
is said to be an (α, k)-anonymization of the table if the view mod-
ifies the table such that the view satisfies both k-anonymity and
α-deassociation properties with respect to the quasi-identifier.
For example, Table 3 is a (0.5, 2)-anonymous view of Table 1
since the size of all equivalence classes with respect to the quasi-
identifier is 2 and each equivalence class contains at most half of
the tuples associating with HIV.
Both parameters α and k are intuitive and operable in real-world
applications. Parameter α caps the confidence of implications from
values in the quasi-identifier to the sensitive value while parameter
k specifies the minimum number of identical quasi-identifications.
DEFINITION 3 (LOCAL RECODING). Given a data set D of
tuples, a function c that convert each tuple t in D to c(t) is a local
recoding for D.
Local recoding typically distorts the values in the tuples in a data
set. We can define a measurement for the amount of distortion
generated by a recoding, which we shall call the recoding cost.
If a suppression is used for recoding of a value which modifies
the value to an unknown *, then the cost can be measured by the
total number of suppressions, or the number of *’s in the resulting
data set. Our objective is to find local recoding with a minimum
cost. We call it the problem of optimal (α, k)-anonymization. The
corresponding decision problem is defined as follows.
(α, k)-ANONYMIZATION: Given a data set D with a quasi-
identifier Q and a sensitive value s, is there a local recoding for
D by a function c such that, after recoding, (α, k)-anonymity is
satisfied and the cost of the recoding is at most C?
Optimal k-anonymization by local recoding is NP-hard as dis-
cussed in [9, 1]. Now, we show that optimal (α, k)-anonymization
by local recoding is also NP-hard.
THEOREM 1. (α, k)-anonymity is NP-hard for a binary alpha-
bet (P = {0, 1} ).
Proof Sketch: The proof is by transforming the problem of
EDGE PARTITION INTO 4-CLIQUES to the (α, k)-anonymity
problem.
EDGE PARTITION INTO 4-CLIQUES: Given a simple graph
G = (V,E), with |E| = 6m for some integer m, can the edges of
G be partitioned into m edge-disjoint 4-cliques? [6]
Given an instance of EDGE PARTITION INTO 4-CLIQUES.
Set α = 0.5 and k = 12. For each vertex v ∈ V , construct a
non-sensitive attribute. For each edge e ∈ E, where e = (v1, v2),
create a pair of records rv1,v2 and erv1,v2 , where the two records
have the attribute values of both v1 and v2 equal to 1 and all other
non-sensitive attribute values equal to 0, but one record rv1,v2 has
the sensitive attribute equal to 1 and the other record erv1,v2 has the
sensitive attribute equal to 0.
We define the cost of the (0.5, 12)-anonymity to be the number
of suppressions applied in the data set. We show that the cost of
the (0.5, 12)-anonymity is at most 48m if and only if E can be
partitioned into a collection of m edge-disjoint 4-cliques.
Suppose E can be partitioned into a collection of m disjoint 4-
cliques. Consider a 4-clique Q with vertices v1, v2, v3and v4. If
we suppress the attributes v1, v2, v3 and v4 in the 12 records corre-
sponding to the edges in Q, then a cluster of these 12 records are
formed where each modified record has four *’s. Note that the α-
deassociation requirement can be satisfied as the frequency of the
sensitive attribute value 1 is equal to 0.5. The cost of the (0.5, 12)-
anonymity is equal to 12× 4×m = 48m.
Suppose the cost of the (0.5, 12)-anonymity is at most 48m. As
G is a simple graph, any twelve records should have at least four
attributes different. So, each record should have at least four *’s
in the solution of the (0.5, 12)-anonymity. Then, the cost of the
(0.5, 12)-anonymity is at least 12 × 4 × m = 48m. Combining
with the proposition that the cost is at most 48m, we obtain the cost
is exactly equal to 48m and thus each record should have exactly
four *’s in the solution. Each cluster should have exactly 12 records
(where six have sensitive value 1 and the other six have sensitive
value 0). Suppose the twelve modified records contain four *’s in
attributes v1, v2, v3 and v4, the records contain 0’s in all other non-
sensitive attributes. This corresponds to a 4-clique with vertices v1,
v2, v3 and v4. Thus, we conclude that the solution corresponds to
a partition into a collection of m edge-disjoint 4-cliques.
Let p be the fraction of the set of tuples that contain sensitive
values. Suppose α is set smaller than p. Then no matter how we
partition the data set, by the pigeon hole principle, there should be
at least one partition P which contains p or more sensitive value,
and therefore cannot satisfy α-deassociation property.
LEMMA 1 (CHOICE OF α). α should be set to a value greater
than or equal to the frequency (given in fraction) of the sensitive
value in the data set D.
Distortion Ratio or Recoding Cost: Since we assume the more
general case of a taxonomy tree for each attribute, we define the
cost of local-recoding based on this model. The cost is given by
the distortion ratio of the resulting data set and is defined as fol-
lows. Suppose the value of the attribute of a tuple has not been
generalized, there will be no distortion. However, if the value of
the attribute of a tuple is generalized to a more general value in the
taxonomy tree, there is a distortion of the attribute of the tuple. If
the value is generalized more (i.e. the original value is updated to
a value at the node of the taxonomy near to the root), the distortion
Gender Birth Postcode Sens
male May 1965 4351 n
male Jun 1965 4351 c
male Jul 1965 4361 n
male Aug 1965 4362 n
Table 5: A Data Set
(a) (b)
No Postcode Sens
1 4351 n
2 4351 c
3 4351 n
4 4352 n
No Postcode Sens
1 4351 n
2 4351 c
3 435* n
4 435* n
Table 6: Projected Table with Quasi-identifier = Postcode: (a)
Original Table and (b) Generalized Table
will be greater. Thus, the distortion of this value is defined in terms
of the height of the value generalized. For example, if the value has
not been generalized, the height of the value generalized is equal to
0. If the value has been generalized one level up in the taxonomy,
the height of the value generalized is equal to 1. Let hi,j be the
height of the value generalized of attribute Ai of the tuple tj . The
distortion of the whole data set is equal to the sum of the distor-
tions of all values in the generalized data set. That is, distortion =P
i,j hi,j . Distortion ratio is equal to the distortion of the general-
ized data set divided by the distortion of the fully generalized data
set, where the fully generalized data set is one with all values of the
attributes are generalized to the root of the taxonomy.
3. GLOBAL-RECODING
In this section, we extend an existing global-recoding based algo-
rithm called Incognito [7] for the (α, k)-anonymous model. Incog-
nito algorithm [7] is an optimal algorithm for the k-anonymity
problem. It has also been used in [8] for the l-diversity problem. [7]
and [8] make use of monotonicity property in searching the solution
space. The searches can be made efficient if a stopping condition
is satisfied. The stopping condition is that, if table T ′ is satisfied
with the privacy requirements, then every generalization of T ′ is
also satisfied with the privacy requirement.
Algorithm: The algorithm is similar to [7, 8]. The difference
is in the testing criteria of each candidate in the solution space. [7]
tests for the k-anonymity property and [8] tests the k-anonymity
and l-diversity properties. Here, we check the (α, k)-anonymity
property.
4. LOCAL-RECODING
The extended Incognito algorithm is an exhaustive global recod-
ing algorithm which is not scalable and may generate excessive dis-
tortions to the data set. Here we propose a scalable local-recoding
algorithm called top-down approach.
In this section, we present a top-down approach to tackle the
problem. For ease of illustration, we first present the approach for
a quasi-identifier of size 1. Then, the method is extended to handle
quasi-identifiers of size greater than 1. The idea of the algorithm is
to first generalize all tuples completely so that, initially, all tuples
are generalized into one equivalence class. Then, tuples are spe-
cialized in iterations. During the specialization, we must maintain
(α, k)-anonymity. The process continues until we cannot special-
ize the tuples anymore.
Let us illustrate with an example in Table 5. Suppose the quasi-
identifer contains Postcode only. Assume that α = 0.5 and k = 2.
Initially, we generalize all four tuples completely to an equivalence
class with Postcode = **** (Figure 1 (a)). Then, we specialize each
tuple one level down in the generalization hierarchy. We obtain the
branch with Postcode = 4*** in Figure 1 (b). In the next iterations,
we obtain the branch with Postcode = 43** and the branch with
Postcode = 435* in Figure 1 (c) and Figure 1 (d), respectively. As
the Postcode of all four tuples starts with the prefix ”435”, there is
only one branch for each specialization of the postcode with pre-
fix ”435”. Next, we can further specialize the tuples into the two
branches as shown Figure 1 (e). Hence the specialization process-
ing can be seen as the growth of a tree.
If each leaf node satisfies (α, k)-anonymity, then the specializa-
tion will be successful. However, we may encounter some prob-
lematic leaf nodes that do not satisfy (α, k)-anonymity. Then, all
tuples in such leaf nodes will be pushed upwards in the generaliza-
tion hierarchy. In other words, those tuples cannot be specialized
in this process. They should be kept unspecialized in the parent
node. For example, in Figure 1 (e), the leaf node with Postcode
= 4352 contains only one tuple, which violates (α, k)-anonymity,
where k = 2. Thus, we have to move this tuple back to the parent
node with Postcode = 435*. See Figure 1 (f).
After the previous step, we move all tuples in problematic leaf
nodes to the parent node. However, if the collected tuples in the par-
ent node do not satisfy (α, k)-anonymity, we should further move
some tuples from other leaf nodes L to the parent node so that the
parent node can satisfy (α, k)-anonymity while L also maintain
the (α, k)-anonymity. For instance, in Figure 1 (f), the parent node
with Postcode = 435* violates (α, k)-anonymity, where k = 2.
Thus, we should move one tuples upwards in the node B with Post-
code = 4351 (which satisfies (α, k)-anonymity). In this example,
we move tuple 3 upwards to the parent node so that both the parent
node and the node B satisfy the (α, k)-anonymity.
Finally, in Figure 1 (g), we obtain a data set where the Postcode
of tuples 3 and 4 are generalized to 435* and the Postcode of tuples
1 and 2 remains 4351. We call the final allocation of tuples in
Figure 1 (g) the final distribution of tuples after the specialization.
The results can be found in Table 6 (b).
In this approach, we have to un-specialize some tuples which
have already satisfied the (α, k)-anonymity. Which tuples should
we select in order to produce a generalized data set with less dis-
tortion? We tackle this issue by the following additional steps. We
further specializing all tuples in all candidate nodes. We repeat the
specialization process until we cannot further specialize the tuples.
Then, for each tuple t, we record the number of times of specializa-
tions. If the tuple t has fewer times of specializations, it should be
considered as a good choice for un-specialization since it is evident
that it cannot be specialized deeply in later steps.
Quasi-identifier of Size More Than 1: Next we extend the
top-down algorithm to handle the case where the quasi-identifier
has a size greater than one. Again, all attributes of the tuples are
generalized fully in the first step. Then, for each iteration, we find
the ”best” attribute for specialization and perform the specialization
for the ”best” attribute. The iteration continues until no further
specialization is available.
Consider a group P . We will specialize the group P by spe-
cializing with one attribute. We have to find the ”best” attribute
for specialization. For each attribute in the quasi-identifer, our ap-
proach ”tries” to specialize P . Then, among those specializations,
we find the ”best” attribute for final specialization. Our criteria of
choosing the ”best” attributes are described as follows.
Criteria 1 (Greatest No of Tuples Specialized): During the
specialization of P , we obtain a final distribution of the tuples.
Some are specialized and some may still remain in P . The ”best”
specialization yields the greatest number of tuples specialized be-
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Figure 1: Top-Down Algorithm for Quasi-identifier of Size 1
Attribute Distinct Values Generalizations Height
1 Age 74 5-, 10-, 20-year ranges 4
2 Work Class 7 Taxonomy Tree 3
3 Education 16 Taxonomy Tree 4
4 Martial Status 7 Taxonomy Tree 3
5 Occupation 14 Taxonomy Tree 2
6 Race 5 Taxonomy Tree 2
7 Sex 2 Suppression 1
8 Native Country 41 Taxonomy Tree 3
9 Salary Class 2 Suppression 1
Table 7: Description of Adult Data Set
cause that corresponds to the least overall distortion.
Criterion 2 (Smallest No of Branching Specialized): In case
there is a tie when we consider the first criterion, we will fur-
ther consider the number of branches specialized (i.e. non-empty
branches). The ”best” specialization yields the smallest number
of branches specialized. The rationale is that smallest number of
branches can be an indicator of more generalized domain and it is
a good choice compared to a less generalized domain.
5. EMPIRICAL STUDY
Pentium IV 2.2GHz PC with 1GM RAM was used to conduct
our experiment. The algorithm was implemented in C/C++. In
our experiment, we adopted the publicly available data set, Adult
Database, at the UCIrvine Machine Learning Repository [3]. This
data set (5.5MB) was also adopted by [7, 8, 14, 5]. We used a
configuration similar to [7, 8]. We eliminated the records with un-
known values. The resulting data set contains 45,222 tuples. Nine
of the attributes were chosen as the quasi-identifier, as shown in Ta-
ble 7. On default, we set k = 2 and α = 0.5, and we chose the first
eight attributes and the last attribute in Table 7 as the quasi-identifer
and the sensitive attribute, respectively.
We evaluated the proposed algorithm in terms of two measure-
ments: execution time and distortion ratio (see Section 2). We con-
ducted the experiments five times and took the average execution
time.
We denote the proposed algorithms by Top Down and eIncog-
nito. eIncognito denotes the extended Incognito algorithm while
Top Down denotes the local-recoding based top-down approach,
respectively.
Figure 2 shows the graphs of the execution time and the dis-
tortion ratio against quasi-identifier size and α when k = 2. In
Figure 2 (a), when α varies, different algorithms change differ-
ently. The execution time of eIncognito Algorithm increases with
α. This is because, when α increases, the number of candidates
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Figure 2: Execution Time and Distortion Ratio Versus Quasi-
identifier Size and α (k = 2)
(representing the generalization domain) increases, and thus the
execution time increases. The execution time of Top Down Al-
gorithm decreases when α increases. In the top-down algorithm,
we may have to unspecialize some tuples in the branches satisfying
(α, k)-anonymity so that the parent P satisfies (α, k)-anonymity.
When α is small, it is more likely that the parent P cannot satisfy
(α, k)-anonymity, triggering this step of un-specialization. As the
un-specialization step is more complex, the execution time is larger
when α is smaller.
In Figure 2 (b), when the quasi-identifer size increases, the ex-
ecution time of the algorithm increases because the complexity of
the algorithms is increased with the quasi-identifier size.
On average, among these three algorithms, eIncognito Algorithm
requires the greatest execution time and Top Down Algorithm has
the smallest execution time. This shows that eIncognito performs
much slower compared with local-recoding based algorithm.
In Figure 2 (c), when α increases, the distortion ratio decreases.
Intuitively, ifα is greater, there is less requirement ofα-deassociation,
yielding fewer operations of generalization of the values in the data
set. Thus, the distortion ratio is smaller.
In Figure 2 (d), it is easy to see why the distortion ratio increases
with the quasi-identifier size. When the quasi-identifier contains
more attributes, there is more chance that the quasi-identifier of
two tuples are different. In other words, there is more chance that
the tuples will be generalized. Thus, the distortion ratio is greater.
When k is larger, it is also obvious that the distortion ratio is greater
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Figure 3: Execution Time and Distortion Ratio Versus Quasi-
identifier Size and α (k = 10)
because it is less likely that the quasi-identifer of two tuples are
equal. On average, Top Down algorithm results in about 3 times
smaller distortion ratio compared with eIncognito Algorithm.
We have also conducted the experiments for k = 10, which is
shown in Figure 3. The results are also similar to the graphs for
k = 2 (as in Figure 2).
6. GENERAL (α,K)-ANONYMITY MODEL
In this section, we will extend the simple (α, k)-model to multi-
ple sensitive values. When there are two or more sensitive values
and they are rare cases in a data set (e.g. HIV and prostate cancer).
We may combine them into one combined sensitive class and the
simple (α, k)-anonymity model is applicable. The inference confi-
dence to each individual sensitive value is smaller than or equal to
the confidence to the combined value, which is controlled by α.
Next we consider the case when all values in an attribute are
sensitive and require protection. It is possible to have an (α, k)-
anonymity model to protect a sensitive attribute when the attribute
contains many values and no single value dominates the attribute
(which will be explained later). The salary attribute in employer
table is an example. When each equivalent class contains three
salary scales with even distribution, we have about 33% confidence
to infer the salary scale of an individual in the equivalent class.
DEFINITION 4 (α-RARE). Given an equivalence class E, an
attribute X and an attribute value x ∈ X. Let (E, x) be the set of
tuples containing x inE and α be a user-specified threshold, where
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Equivalence class E is α-rare with respect to attribute
set X if the proportion of every attribute value of X in the data set
is not greater than α, i.e. |(E, x)|/|E| ≤ α for x ∈ X.
For example, in Table 3, ifX = Illness, equivalent class {t3, t4}
is 0.5-rare because ”flu” and ”fever” occur evenly in the equivalent
class. If every equivalent class is α-rare in the class, the data set is
called α-deassociated.
DEFINITION 5 (GENERAL α-DEASSOCIATION PROPERTY).
Given a data setD, an attribute setQ and a sensitive class attribute
S. Let α be a user-specified threshold, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Data
set D is generally α-deassociated with respect to an attribute set Q
and a sensitive attribute S if, for any equivalent classes E ⊂ D, E
is α-rare with respect to S.
For example, Table 3 is 0.5-deassociated since all three equiva-
lent classes, {t1, t6}, {t2, t5} and {t3, t4}, are 0.5-rare with respect
to attribute set Illness. When a data set is α-deassociated with re-
spect to a sensitive attribute, it is α-deassociated with respect to
every value in the attribute. Therefore, the upper bound of infer-
ence confidence from the quasi-identifier to the sensitive attribute
is α.
The proposed algorithms in Sections 3 and 4 can be extended
to the general (α, k)-anonymity model. The global-recoding based
algorithm depends on the monotonicity property. The propoerty
holds for the general (α, k)-anonymity. Thus, the global-recoding
based algorithm can be extended by modifying the step of testing
of candidates with the general model.
The top-down local-recoding algorithm can also be easily ex-
tended to the general model by modifying the condition when test-
ing the candidates.
7. CONCLUSION
The k-anonymity model protects identification information, but
does not protect sensitive relationships in a data set. In this paper,
we propose the (α, k)-anonymity model to protect both identifica-
tions and relationships in data. We discuss the properties of the
model. We prove that achieving optimal (α, k)-anonymity by lo-
cal recoding is NP-hard. We present an optimal global-recoding
method and an efficient local-encoding based algorithm to trans-
form a data set to satisfy (α, k)-anonymity property. The experi-
ment shows that, on average, the local-encoding based algorithm
performs about 4 times faster and gives about 3 times less distor-
tions of the data set compared with the global-recoding algorithm.
We also describe how the model can be extended to more general
cases.
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